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NOTE
THE CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURE:
CHALLENGING STEPCHILDREN'S LACK OF
INHERITANCE RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Today "the large majority of people die intestate," and
thus, state law, rather than a will, determines who inherits a
decedent's estate.' Consequently, unadopted stepchildren often
do not inherit from their stepparents because most intestacy
schemes limit distribution of a decedent's estate to individuals
who were either related to a decedent by blood or were legally
adopted by a decedent.2 In fact, nearly one-third of our states
have ratified laws that are substantially similar to the Uni-
form Probate Code (the "UPC"), which does not pass
stepparents' estates to their unadopted stepchildren.' Thus,
' JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLs, TRusTs, AND ESTATES
71-72 (6th ed. 2000). See BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 827 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
people who die intestate as individuals who die without a will). See also Margorie
Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club-Examining the Financial
[InIsecurity of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 309, 350
(1999) (citing Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth
Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 243 (1963)); Jaki Y. Samuelson &
Dennis Thorson, Contemporary Studies Project: A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive
Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63
IOWA L. REv. 1041, 1043 (1978).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2000) (prohib-
iting stepchildren from inheriting from stepparents who die intestate).
' Section 2-103 of the UPC reads as follows:
Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving
spouse under Section 2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no
surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals desig-
nated below who survive the decedent:
(1) to the decedent's descendants by representation;
(2) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally
if both survive, or to the surviving parent;
(3) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of
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unadopted stepchildren, notwithstanding potentially close
relationships with their stepparents, have no inheritance
rights because they are not legal descendants of their deceased
stepparents." Instead, a "laughing heir," someone who is not
closely linked to a decedent and suffers no loss from a
decedent's absence, often inherits a decedent's estate.5
the decedent's parents or either of them by representation;
(4) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent,
but the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants
of grandparents, half of the estate passes to the decedent's paternal
grandparents equally if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grand-
parent, or to the descendants of the decedent's paternal grandparents or
either of them if both are deceased, the descendants taking by represen-
tation; and the other half passes to the decedent's maternal relatives in
the same manner; but if there is no surviving grandparent or descendant
of a grandparent on either the paternal or the maternal side, the entire
estate passes to the decedent's relatives on the other side in the same
manner as the half.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 73-74 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-103 (amended 1975)). See also Robert A. Weems & Katherine L. Evans, Missis-
sippi Law of Intestate Succession, Wills, and Administration and the Proposed
Mississippi Uniform Probate Code: A Comparative Analysis, 62 MISS. L.J. 1, 5-6
(1992) (citing 8 U.L.A. 1 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that Alaska, Arizona, Colora-
do, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah have adopted the UPC)).
' But see Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d 472, 473 (Cal. 1998) (holding that
unadopted stepchildren may inherit from their stepparent's estate when steppar-
ents would have adopted their stepchildren but for a legal barrier which existed
until the stepparent's death).
' Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provi-
sions for Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 949 (1995)
(citing David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir,"
20 IOwA L. REv. 203, 208 (1935) (arguing that the rate at which laughing heirs
claim inheritance rights is likely to increase)).
In some states, one may use either the degree-of-relationship system or the
parentelic system to determine which relative inherits a decedents estate when
that decedent's first-line collaterals (siblings) are deceased. See DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 91. According to the degree of relationship system,
one counts "degrees of kinship" to determine which person is "the closest of kin"
with inheritance rights. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 93. One counts
the number of steps for each generation up from the intestate decedent to the
decedent's closest common ancestor, and then one counts the number of steps
down from that common ancestor to the claimant to figure out the degree-of-rela-
tionship between the claimant and the decedent. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON,
supra note 1, at 93. The combined numbers of steps up and down constitute "the
degree of relationship." DUEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 93. Under that
system, distant relatives, such as third cousins thrice removed, may have inheri-
tance rights. See DtJKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 92.
Furthermore, the parentelic system transfers the estate 'to grandparents and
their descendants, and if none to great-grandparents and their descendants, and if
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Furthermore, according to Section 2-105 of the UPC, "[i]f
there is no taker.., the intestate estate passes to the
[state]."6 Thus, the UPC does not even provide stepchildren
with inheritance rights when all of a decedent's relatives are
deceased. By comparison, several intestacy statutes give inher-
itance rights to a decedent's stepchildren when all of that
decedent's relatives are deceased and the property would oth-
erwise pass to the state v However, it is reasonable to believe
that a decedent's estate passes to relatives more often than it
passes to the state, and consequently, stepchildren are often
left without inheritance rights.
Hence, the purpose of this Note is to emphasize the impor-
tance of stepfamilies in today's society and to stress the need
to provide stepchildren with inheritance rights. Part I exam-
ines California's intestacy statute, which appears to provide
stepchildren with more inheritance rights than do other intes-
tacy statutes.' Part I also discusses the recent California Su-
none to great-great-grandparents and their descendants, and so on down each line
(parentela) descended from an ancestor until an heir is found." DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 91-93.
However, by contrast, the UPC approaches the "laughing heir" issue different-
ly than does the degree-of-relationship or parentelic system. DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 73-74. Under Section 2-103 of the UPC, grandparents
and their descendants are the last generation permitted to inherit from an intes-
tate decedent. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 73-74. Thus, accord-
ing to Section 2-103 of the UPC, distant relatives may not inherit from an intes-
tate decedents estate. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 73-74.
6 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 74.
See Engel, supra note 1, at 354 (citing Sol Lovas, When is a Family Not a
Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-traditional
Family, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 377 (1988)). See also Lovas, supra, at 367 (citing
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(I) (West 1999) (providing stepchildren with inheri-
tance rights when no legal relatives are alive and the property would pass to the
State by default)); Lovas, supra, at 377 (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(e) (West
2000) (expressly providing inheritance rights for stepchildren "[i]f there is no sur-
viving issue, parent or issue of a parent, grandparent or issue of a grandparent"
regardless of whether property would pass to the state)). See also Margaret M.
Mahoney, Symposium: The Changing Role of the Family in the Law: Stepfamilies
in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 920-21
(1989) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-276(a)(5) (West Supp. 1988) currently
known as CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-439(a)(4) (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-104(e) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 62-2-103(6) (1999) (pro-
viding stepchildren with inheritance rights when the property would otherwise
pass to the state)).
8 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2000).
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preme Court decision, Estate of Joseph,9 which limited the
application of California's intestacy statute."0 Consequently,
California's intestacy statute does not provide the majority of
stepchildren with inheritance rights. Part II reviews sociologi-
cal data regarding stepfamily relationships and uses that data
to assess California's intestacy statute as well as the majority
of other intestacy statutes. Sociological studies are likely to
lead one to conclude that the California intestacy statute, as
well as other intestacy statutes, does not satisfy the modern
stepfamily's needs. Part III evaluates existing proposals that
claim to remedy stepchildren's inheritance problems. Part IV
argues that state legislatures should amend existing intestacy
statutes to reflect the sociological changes that have affected
the modern family. Part IV also proposes a more suitable in-
testacy statute that better reflects sociological findings than do
the California intestacy statute and other existing reform pro-
posals.
I. CALIFORNIA'S INTESTACY STATUTE AND CASE LAW
In contrast to both the UPC's intestacy provision and the
majority of other state intestacy statutes, stepchildren appear
to have greater inheritance rights under California's intestacy
statute." Specifically, Section 6454 of the California Probate
Code provides that stepchildren may inherit from stepparents
who die intestate when the following three requirements are
satisfied. First, the stepfamily relationship must begin dur-
ing the stepchild's minority. 3 Second, the stepfamily relation-
ship must continue during the stepchild's and stepparent's
joint lifetimes. 4 Third, clear and convincing evidence must
establish that the "stepparent would have adopted the person
but for a legal barrier.""5
949 P.2d 472 (Cal. 1998).
19 See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 473.
1' See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2000).
12 See id.
13 See id. "A minor is an individual who is under 18 years of age." CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6500 (West Supp. 2000).
14 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2000).
15 Id.
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There was much debate about the meaning of Section
6454's third requirement 6 prior to the California Supreme
Court's decision in Estate of Joseph.17 Specifically, the Sixth
District of the Court of Appeals in In re the Estate of
Stevenson" and the Second District of the Court of Appeals in
Estate of Cleveland 9 disagreed as to whether Section 6454
required one to prove that stepparents would have adopted but
for a legal barrier that existed until the stepparents' deaths,"0
or whether Section 6454 required one to prove that stepparents
would have adopted but for a legal barrier that only existed
during the stepchildren's minority.2' In both cases, the natural
parent refused to consent to the only adoption attempt that
was made during the children's minority.22 However, despite
similar fact patterns, the courts' holdings differed.
In In re the Estate of Stevenson, the court held that the
legal barrier to adoption just had to exist during the
stepchildren's minority.' In other words, the stepchildren did
not have to prove that the legal barrier existed until their
stepparent's death.24 Consequently, in In re the Estate of
Stevenson, the court awarded inheritance rights to the stepchil-
dren because their stepparent's adoption attempt during the
stepchildren's minority was barred by the natural parent's
refusalY
By contrast, in Estate of Cleveland, the court held that the
legal barrier to adoption had to exist until the foster parent's
death.26 In other words, the foster child did not obtain inheri-
tance rights even though the foster parent's adoption attempt
during the child's minority was prevented by the natural
6 Section 6454's third requirement refers to Sectior. 6454(b) of the California
Probate Code.
"' See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 473 (discussing the meaning of Section
6454 of the California Probate Code).
' 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
,9 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
29 See generally Estate of Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250
21 See generally Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590.
" See Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596; Estate of Stevenson, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 255.
See Estate of Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
24 See id.
See id.
26 See Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599-600 (finding that Section
6454 applies to foster parents as well as to stepparents).
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parent's refusal. The foster parent was required to attempt
adoption again during the foster child's majority," when the
natural parent's consent was no longer needed." Had such an
adoption attempt failed due to a legal barrier, then the foster
child would have received inheritance rights.29 Consequently,
in Estate of Cleveland, the foster child was not entitled to any
inheritance right because his foster parent was not prevented
from adopting the child during the child's majority."
In Estate of Joseph, the California Supreme Court resolved
the dispute between the Court of Appeals' Second and Sixth
Districts by agreeing with the Cleveland decision.31 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reaffirmed Cleveland's decision, which
required stepchildren to prove that a stepparent would have
adopted them but for a legal barrier that existed until their
stepparent's death.2 Thus, a stepchild does not inherit from a
stepparent's estate even when the following requirements are
satisfied: (1) the stepchild-stepparent relationship began dur-
ing the stepchild's minority; (2) the stepfamily relationship
continued throughout both individuals' lives; and (3) the step-
parent would have adopted the stepchild during the stepchild's
minority but for a legal adoption barrier.3 In other words,
stepchildren will not inherit a stepparent's estate unless the
deceased stepparent tried to adopt the stepchildren during the
stepchildren's majority, when the natural parent's consent was
no longer necessary for adoption. 4
27 "An adult [person of majority age] is an individual who is 18 years of age or
older." CAL. FAM. CODE § 6501 (West 2000).
oa See Estate of Cleveland 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599-600.
Legal barriers may exist during stepchildren's majority. For instance, some
legal barriers include the lack of consent by the adoptee, the adoptee's spouse, or
the spouse of the adopting person. In addition, the law prohibits the adoption of
more than one unrelated adult each year unless the adoptee is physically handi-
capped or disabled or unless the adoptee is the biological brother or sister of an
individual already adopted. It is also essential that adult adoption be in the public
interest as well as in the interest of the individual petitioning for adoption. See
Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 479 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9301-9303, 9328
(West 1999)); Lovas, supra note 7, at 373 (citing Doby v. Carroll, 147 So.2d 803
(Ala. 1962)). See generally Appeal of Ritchie, 53 N.W.2d 753 (Neb. 1952) (discuss-
ing the prohibition of adult adoptions).
30 See Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599-600.
3' See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 473.
32 See id.
See id. at 477.
3' See id. at 481 (intending to preserve the decedent's intent).
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Stepchildren will not have inheritance rights if natural
parents prevent stepparents from adopting the children during
their minority, except in the rare situation where stepchildren
are still minors when their stepparents die.35 Thus, the Cali-
fornia intestacy statute prevents almost all adult stepchildren
from inheriting their stepparents' estates.36  Indeed,
California's intestacy statute does not provide many stepchil-
dren with inheritance rights because it appears unlikely that
many stepparents will try to adopt their stepchildren during
the stepchildren's majority.37 Such a statute practically disre-
gards the stepfamily relationship, and in actuality, does not
provide stepchildren with much more of an inheritance right
than do the majority of other intestacy statutes. Consequently,
both California's intestacy statute and other intestacy statutes
should be examined closely, especially considering that as the
number of stepfamilies increases, there is a greater possibility
that intestacy statutes can frequently affect stepchildren in a
harsh manner.
In fact, according to the Bureau of the Census, "more
Americans will be living in stepfamilies than [in traditional
families] by the year 2000."31 Consequently, in the United
States, "more than one-half of today's [youth will become step-
children] by the year 2000.""9 In addition, other staggering
" See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 486 (Chin, Assoc. J., dissenting). For ex-
ample, a stepchild would receive inheritance rights if the natural parent refused to
consent to the stepparent's adoption attempt during the stepchild's minority and
the stepparent died before the stepchild was eighteen years old.
"6 See id. at 486 (Chin, Assoc. J., dissenting) (citing Recommendation: Inher-
itance by Foster Child or Stepchild (Oct. 1997) 27 CAL. LAW REVISION COM. REP.
(1997) p. x6 [preprint copy]).
"' Individuals often view adoption in the context of stepparents adopting minor
rather than adult children. See, e.g., Stepparent Adoptions (last modified 1998)
<httpJ/www.homes4kids.orglsteppar.htm> (stating that custodial parents and step-
parents should really think about the child's best interests prior to adoption).
Adopting a minor child may require more consideration than adopting an adult
because a minor child most likely requires more care and supervision than an
adult. A minor child not only needs food and shelter but also needs guidance and
nurturing. Hence, it is logical to conclude that the "child" referred to above is a
minor rather than an adult child.
"6 Stepfamily Foundation: The Statistics are Staggering (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
<httpJ/www.stepfam.org/statistics.html> [hereinafter, Stepfamily Foundation].
" Engel, supra note 1, at 323 (citing Paul C. Glick, Remarried Families,
Stepfamilies, and Stepchildren: A Brief Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24, 26
(1989)).
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statistics indicate that 40% "of all marriages today are remar-
riages for at least one [spouse]," and children from previous
marriages are involved in nearly 65% of those remarriages."
Thus, one must question whether state legislatures need to
amend existing state intestacy laws to reflect changes in fami-
ly composition, and, if so, one must determine whether
California's intestacy statute is a proper role model for other
states to follow. If the California intestacy statute does not
satisfy the needs of the modem stepfamily, then one must
design a more suitable proposal.
II. ANALYSIS OF INTESTACY STATUTES
A. General Background Concerning Intestacy Statutes
The goal of intestacy statutes is to carry out the testamen-
tary intent of the majority of decedents.4 Thus, one must de-
termine how the majority of stepparents want their property to
be distributed upon death. The following questions should be
asked when making that determination: Do the majority of
stepparents want their stepchildren to attain parity with bio-
logical children and thus, inherit as if they were biological
children? Do the majority of stepparents want to pass their
estates to blood relatives and leave their stepchildren with
nothing? Do the majority of stepparents want to distribute the
bulk of their estates to blood relatives, while providing step-
children with a smaller share based on other criteria, such as
the number of years that the stepfamily relationship existed
and the age of the stepchildren when the stepfamily relation-
ship began?
B. Sociological Data Regarding Stepfamily Relationships
Even though some individuals argue that intestacy stat-
utes should be amended to give stepchildren inheritance rights
to keep apace with the increasing number of stepfamilies and
40 NebFacts: Supporting Stepfamilies (last modified Apr. 1995)
<http://www.ianr.unl.edu/pubs/family/nf212.htm>.
41 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 74 (stating that one must
determine the intent of the typical intestate decedent).
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the changes in family composition,42 it is not necessarily accu-
rate to assume that stepparents want their entire estates to
pass to stepchildren. In fact, granting stepchildren broad in-
heritance rights might not be the best solution considering the
following factors: (1) 60% of remarriages end in divorce,43 (2)
some stepparents claim that they participate in fewer activities
with their stepchildren and treat such children less affection-
ately than natural parents treat their children," and (3) time
is needed for stepfamilies to develop family closeness. 5
Other sociological data also prevents one from equating
the stepfamily relationship with the traditional family unit.
For instance, children in stepfamilies may receive less assis-
tance and support with their homework than do children who
live with two natural parents." Furthermore, stepparents
may be more detached in raising their stepchildren than in
raising their biological children. In addition, "financial com-
mitment to a new wife or new husband comes slowly; and still
more slowly, if at all, comes financial commitment to step-chil-
dren."48 Thus, one should not necessarily assume that step-
parents want their entire estates to pass to stepchildren.
Stepparents might even want to protect their biological
children's interests from those of their stepchildren.49 In fact,
42 In fact, if recent marital trends continue, approximately "4 out of 10 first
marriages" will 'end in divorce" and alternatively, if there is a return to the di-
vorce trends of the late 1970s, then "5 out of 10 first marriages may eventually
end in divorce." Arthur J. Norton & Louisa F. Miller, Marriage, Divorce, and Re-
marriage in the 1990s, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P23-180, 5 (1992).
' See Stepfamily Foundation, supra note 38. See also Norton & Miller, supra
note 42, at 1 ("Large proportions of the population will continue to be affected by
divorce and its consequences.").
"' See Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman & Kay Pasley, Stepfamilies in 1984 and
Today-A Scholarly Perspective, in STEPFAMIuES: HISTORY, RESEARCH AND POLICY
19, 22 (Irene Levin & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1997).
" See Ihinger-Tallman & Pasley, supra note 44, at 22 (citing J. H. Bray,
Children's Development in Early Remarriage, in THE IMPACT OF DIVORCE, SINGLE
PARENTING, AND STEPPARENTING ON CHILDREN 279-98 (E.M. Hetherington & J.D.
Arasteh eds., 1988); E.M. Hetherington, The Role of Individual Differences and
Family Relationships in Children's Coping with Divorce & Remarriage, in FAMHLY
TRANSITIONS 165-94 (P. Cowan & E. M. Hetherington eds., 1991)).
" See Chandler Arnold, Children and Stepfamilies: A Snapshot (last
modified Nov. 1998)
<httpJ/www.clasp.org/pubs/familyformation/stepfamiliesfinal.BKI.htm>.
" See id.
48 Engel, supra note 1, at 317 (citing Barbara Fishman, The Economic Behavior
of Stepfamilies, 32 FAM. REL. 359, 366 (1982)).
" See MERRY BLOCH JONES & JO ANN SCHILLER, STEPMOTHERS: KEEPING IT
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women who bring biological children to a marriage often want
to separate assets that pass to their biological children from
the assets that pass to their stepchildren, especially if such
assets are personal or sentimental items." Stepmothers usu-
ally do not believe that their biological children and stepchil-
dren should receive equivalent amounts of assets.51 Steppar-
ents may not even like their stepchildren and thus, may resent
them. Hence, conflicts in such stepfamilies are common. "2
Stepparents often have feelings of anger, jealousy, and
rejection as they adjust to stepfamily relationships. One author
recounted her stepfamily problems, stating that she once yelled
to her stepdaughter not to "ever call me Mom again. Never."5"
Another stepmother said that thoughts of her stepchildren
disturbed her so much that her stomach ached when she saw
them.M
However, stepfamily relationships vary from family to
family just as traditional families vary.5 Some traditional
families are comprised of closely-knit people, who enjoy spend-
ing time with other family members and who exhibit positive
feelings toward one another. However, other traditional fami-
lies are merely comprised of people related by blood, who expe-
rience friction when interacting with other family members.
Moreover, stepfamily relationships vary. That is, even though
one stepmother may become ill when thinking about her step
TOGETHER WITH YOUR HUSBAND AND His KIDS 67 (1992).
5o See id.
M See id. at 70-71.
12 See ELIZABETH EINSTEIN, THE STEPFAMILY: LIVING, LOVING & LEARNING 63
(1982) (discussing conflict among stepfamily members). See also LESLIE ALDRIDGE
WESTOFF, THE SECOND TIME AROUND: REMARRIAGE IN AMERICA 72 (1977) (stating
that problems are magnified by remarriage). "The raising of children is not easy in
any family, but for stepparents it is doubly difficult. Because of the complicated
nature of stepfamilies, numerous challenges and questions arise which are not
talked about in the thousands of books written about child-rearing. There is no
Dr. Spock for stepparents and remarried parents." See EMILY VISHER & JOHN
VISHER, How TO WIN As A STEPFAMILY 1 (1982).
" EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 3.
54 See JONES & SCHILLER, supra note 49, at 43.
" See Engel, supra note 1, at 322 (citing Judith Zucker Anderson & Geoffry D.
White, An Empirical Investigation of Interaction and Relationship Patterns in
Functional and Dysfunctional Nuclear Families and Stepfamilies, 25 FAM. PROCESS
407 (1986)).
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children, other stepmothers feel the same way about their
stepchildren as they do about their biological children.56
Furthermore, some sociological findings demonstrate that
stepparents not only view their stepchildren in a favorable
light but also that stepparents develop close ties with their
stepchildren. Stepfamilies may be tightly knit and see them-
selves as one unit rather than as separate groups.57 In fact,
Lucile Duberman's study of 88 stepfamilies revealed that 82%
of the stepfamilies' relationships were rated "Excellent" or
"Good," as compared with the 18% that were rated "Poor."58
Furthermore, case law and other sociological studies indi-
cate that many stepparents think of their stepchildren as their
own biological children, and they treat them accordingly. "
Specifically, studies demonstrate that stepfathers treat their
stepchildren nearly as well as natural fathers treat their bio-
logical children.60 In addition, stepchildren no longer view
their stepmothers in the same way that Cinderella viewed her
wicked stepmother.61 For instance, one teenage stepchild con-
siders the stepfamily structure a positive part of her life.62
56 See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 51.
67 See LUCILE DUBERMAN, THE RECONSTITUTED FAMILY: A STUDY OF REMARRIED
COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN 63 (1975). But see id. at 63-64 (revealing that some
stepfamilies do not want to do things as a group); WESTOFF, supra note 52, at 75
(revealing that stepparents and children may exhibit feelings of jealously, hostility
and competition towards one another).
5, DUBERMAN, supra note 57, at 9, 50.
See, e.g., Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 474 (demonstrating that the deceased
foster parent treated his foster child as his own daughter by giving her away on
her wedding day); Estate of Crossman, 377 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(demonstrating that deceased stepparent viewed his stepchildren as his biological
children by referring to them "as his children" and treating them accordingly); In
re Berge's Estate, 47 N.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Minn. 1951) (demonstrating that the
stepfather viewed his stepchildren as his biological children by financially support-
ing them and expressing a desire that the word "father" be written on his tomb-
stone).
60 See NORMAN GOODMAN, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 295 (1993). However,
stepfathers view themselves as having a lesser impact than do natural fathers
because stepfathers consider themselves to be outsiders who disturb the regular
family routine. See id. at 295-96.
"' See Rosie Vroman, The Second Wives Club: Wicked Stepmothers, Fact or Fic-
tion? (last modified 1999) <http://www.secondwivesclub.com/fairytalesl.htm> (dis-
cussing how fairytales depict stepmothers).
62 See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 187.
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She enjoys having more than one mother because she can ask
them both the same question and receive advice from two peo-
ple that care for her.63
Stepparents perceive themselves as caring individuals who
want to be good parents," and, "[alt the very least, [stepmoth-
ers] intend to develop caring relationships with their stepchil-
dren."65 One stepparent said that she loves her stepdaughter
so much that it is difficult to believe that they share an emo-
tional rather than a biological link.6 Similarly, other step-
mothers believe that stepchildren have enriched their lives.67
A biological parent even stated that her second husband refers
to her daughter "as his daughter rather than as his stepdaugh-
ter," and he is more her father than her real father ever
was or is now."69 Finally, another stepmother's positive atti-
tude toward the stepfamily relationship is demonstrated by her
fond recollection of the warm embrace that she received from
her stepchild who was returning home from summer camp.7"
Adult stepchildren also remember the positive ways in
which their stepparents influenced their lives.71 One step-
daughter recounted that she often stayed at home before her
mother's remarriage, after which her stepfather exposed her to
traveling, camping, and fishing outings.7 2 Another adult step-
child recalled that referring to her stepfather as "Dad" made
her feel more similar to her friends who were raised in tradi-
tional families.73
Thus, stepfamilies may positively influence stepchildren
because "[e]xtra parental figures offer new places and experi-
See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 187.
See MALA BURT, STEPFAMILIES STEPPING AHEAD: AN EIGHT-STEP PROGRAM
FOR SUCCESSFUL FAMILY LIVING 7 (Mala Burt ed., 3rd ed. 1989).
JONES & SCHILLER, supra note 49, at 181.
See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 189.
See WESTOFF, supra note 52, at 161.
6 DUBERMAN, supra note 57, at 53.
6' DUBERMAN, supra note 57, at 53.
" See WESTOFF, supra note 52, at 161.
21 See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 185.
" See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 185-86. One adult stepchild recounted how
her urban stepmother taught her about hospitality and social etiquette. See EIN-
STEIN, supra note 52, at 186. Another stepchild recalled that her stepfather rein-
forced positive values, such as perseverance, self-discipline and hard work. See
EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 186.
" See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 186.
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ences" to their stepchildren. 4 Some studies even suggest that
children in such families are as academically and socially suc-
cessful and as happy as children in traditional families. 71
Thus, the stepfamily relationship may even provide stepchil-
dren with the best of two worlds."
However, regardless of the type of relationship that
stepfamilies form, stepparents have the option to write wills,
in which they can specifically provide their unadopted stepchil-
dren with inheritance rights. Nevertheless, stepparents may
not write wills due to the following factors: (1) their fears of
confronting death,7 (2) their beliefs about the expense of will
execution,"8 or (3) their lack of awareness concerning the ab-
sence of stepchildren's inheritance rights.79
C. An Assessment of California's Intestacy Statute and Other
Intestacy Statues
To determine whether California's intestacy statute is a
proper role model for other states to follow, one must examine
the statute and sociological data regarding stepparents' testa-
mentary intent. As presently interpreted, the California intes-
tacy statute requires that stepparents try to adopt stepchildren
during the stepchildren's majority, even if stepparents' adop-
tion attempts during the stepchildren's minority were thwarted
by a legal barrier."0
7' EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 187. See also Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H.
Ganong, Stepfamilies from the Stepfamily's Perspective, in STEPFAMILIES: HISTORY,
RESEARCH, AND POLICY, supra note 44, at 107, 118 (stating that some stepchildren
believe that stepparents have broadened their horizons through exposure to new
sports, hobbies and various interests).
" See Barbara J. Wurzel, C.H.E., Ohio State University Extension Fact Sheet:
Growing Up With Yours, Mine And Ours In Stepfamilies (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
<http'/www.ag.ohio-state.edu/-ohioline/hyg-factt5000/5292.htm>.
" See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 187. However, one must realize that both
worlds may produce values that conflict with one another and consequently, the
stepfamily relationship may confuse stepchildren. See EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at
188.
77 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 71 ("[M]ost people cannot ac-
cept and plan for the fact of their own death.").
78 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 67.
71 If stepparents were aware of this situation, then they would simply accord
inheritance rights to their stepchildren in wills and no controversy or case law
would surround this area of law.
"' See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 473; CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 2000).
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Such a requirement does not always satisfy, and may even
conflict with, stepparents' desires. Stepparents may simply
decide that adoption is not important once stepchildren become
adults even though such stepparents want their stepchildren to
have inheritance rights.8' One stepparent stated that
"[aldopting her [stepdaughter] at nineteen would have added
nothing to our love and commitment."82 Adult stepchildren
may also be parents themselves and consequently, stepparents
may believe that it is not necessary to formally adopt such
stepchildren, who already have families of their own. Thus, one
might argue in favor of stepchildren's inheritance rights, even
when adoption has not occurred, because a close stepfamily
relationship may form regardless of whether stepparents adopt
their stepchildren.83 Such stepparents may want their step-
children to have inheritance rights, even though there was no
formal adoption proceeding.
Furthermore, one should not assume that stepparents
avoid the subject of adoption to limit their stepchildren's inher-
itance rights. Rather, stepparents may not broach the subject
of adoption because stepparents may want to avoid placing
children in an uncomfortable position in which stepchildren
would have to reject non-custodial biological parents.
"[Slevering a biological" link may not be easy.' Even if a bio-
logical parent is deceased, the subject of adoption may create
psychological dilemmas for stepchildren who will not want to
reject their deceased biological parents or offend their steppar-
ents.85 Hence, it is difficult to discuss inheritance, which re-
sults in a phenomenon called "passive neglect."'
Stepparents may also not attempt adoption to avoid what
they believe will be an expensive, 7 tedious, and lengthy pro-
cess. In fact, such beliefs are not necessarily wrong because
stepparents may need to hire an attorney to adopt their step-
, See Estate of Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
82 EINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 163.
"3 See VISHER & VISHER, supra note 52, at 20 (indicating that emotional bonds
may still develop between unadopted stepchildren and their stepparents).
8 EINSTEIN, supra note 51, at 163 (indicating that stepchildren may not con-
sent to adoption by their stepparents due to stepchildren's fears of hurting biologi-
cal parents).
See VISHER & VISHER, supra note 51, at 142.
88 Engel, supra note 1, at 343.
See RENATO ESPINOZA & YVONNE NEWMAN, STEPPARENTING 33 (1979).
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children." Attorneys may be necessary to clarify the legal
meanings of support and abandonment, which differ among the
states. 9 Similarly, stepparents might also avoid writing a
will, which could give stepchildren inheritance rights, due to
analogous beliefs that drafting a will is a time-consuming and
expensive process."
Moreover, California's intestacy statute is not significantly
more equitable than other state intestacy statutes that simply
deny inheritance rights to stepchildren.91 In many cases, an
inequity would result regardless of whether a particular case
was decided according to Section 6454 of the California Pro-
bate Code or another state's intestacy statute.
For instance, in In re Estate of Crossman,92 the intestate
decedent died with stepchildren, whom he referred to as his
own children and treated accordingly." One stepchild's wed-
ding invitation even indicated that she was the decedent's
daughter.94 However, regardless of the strong stepfamily rela-
tionship, and the Michigan Court of Appeals' belief that the
decedent wanted to pass his estate to his stepchildren, the
court did not award any inheritance rights to the stepchil-
dren.9" The court reasoned that there was no discussion of
adoption when the stepparent was alive. 6 Furthermore, it
does not appear that a legal barrier to adoption was present. 7
Thus, like the Michigan Court of Appeals, a California court,
applying California's broader intestacy statute, would still
most likely deny inheritance rights to the stepchildren in
Crossman.
Similarly, in In re Berge's Estate, the Minnesota Supreme
Court prevented stepchildren from inheriting their stepfather's
estate even though he clearly wanted them to have inheritance
rights.8 The intestate decedent sometimes referred to his
8 See Stepparent Adoptions, supra note 37.
,' See id.
9o See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 71.
9' See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 2000).
377 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
'3 See Estate of Crossman, 377 N.W.2d at 852.
9 See id.
See id. at 852-53.
'6 See id.
', See generally Estate of Crossman, 377 N.W.2d 850.
98 See In re Berge's Estate, 47 N.W.2d at 430-31.
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stepchildren as his "girls," and he told them that they would
inherit his estate. 9 Under the California test, the decedent's
stepchildren would not be given any inheritance rights because
there was no legal barrier to adoption.
In contrast to Estate of Crossman and Berge's Estate, there
may occasionally be a difference between the way in which the
California Probate Code and other intestacy statutes apply to a
particular case's facts. For instance, in Estate of Lind,' Rob-
ert Lincoln and Henrietta Haughey (the "Haugheys") treated
their foster child as their biological child and supported him
with life's necessities. The foster relationship began during the
foster child's minority and was maintained throughout the
foster child's and foster parents' life together. 1  The
Haugheys referred to the foster child as their son and had
adoption papers prepared in 1942, when the army drafted the
then twenty-two year old child.0 2 The Haugheys even re-
quested that the name on their foster child's birth certificate
be changed to "Warren Harding Haughey."' Unfortunately,
despite the Haughey's efforts, the state did not comply with
their requests and they never legally adopted their foster
child. ' 4 Consequently, the foster child had no time "to take
any legal action" because both of his foster parents were de-
ceased when he learned that they had never legally adopted
him.
10 5
Eventually, the California Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's dismissal and granted the foster child an eviden-
tiary hearing regarding "his standing to contest probate of the
purported will."' Although it is not clear, the following three
reasons would lead one to conclude that a California court
would grant such a foster child inheritance rights, disregarding
the foster child's standing and issues related to the will. First,
the relationship between the Haugheys and their foster child
" See id. at 430.
"' See Estate of Lind, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1424, 1429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
101 See id.
10 See id.
103 Id.
104 See id.
See Estate of Lind, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1429.
" Id. at 1437.
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began during the foster child's minority."7 Second, the foster
family relationship continued during the foster child's and
foster parents' joint lifetime.' Third, the California law,
which prohibited adult adoptions prior to 1951, provided the
court with clear and convincing evidence that a legal barrier
prevented the Haugheys from adopting their foster child.0 9
By contrast, the majority of other states would not grant inher-
itance rights to such a foster child. Most intestacy statutes do
not grant stepchildren inheritance rights even if a legal barrier
prevented stepparents from successfully adopting stepchil-
dren." Such an analysis indicates that there may occasional-
ly be a difference between the application of Section 6454 of
the California Probate Code and the majority of other intestacy
statutes. However, on the whole, both California's intestacy
statute and other intestacy statutes appear to produce inequi-
table results"' in the realm of stepfamily inheritance
rights.12
'07 See id. at 1429.
10 See id.
10 See id. at 1434.
10 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1999).
. Similarly, inequity has often resulted in other sectors of estate law, such as
will executions. Just as it appears unfair to deprive stepchildren of inheritance
rights when a close family relationship existed between stepchildren and their
stepparents, it is also unjust to deprive an intended beneficiary of his inheritance
rights merely because every will execution formality was not satisfied. See
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 234 (citing In re Estate of Wait, 306
S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (denying probate when elderly testator's shaking
hand prevented her from signing her name until the witnesses had left)).
1"2 However, one could still make several arguments in favor of California's in-
testacy statute, which does not award inheritance rights to stepchildren when their
stepparents unsuccessfully attempted to adopt them during their minority. See
Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 473; CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2000). In
many situations, stepparents might not want stepchildren to have inheritance
rights even though such stepparents attempted to adopt the stepchildren during
their minority. For example, stepparents may have tried to adopt such stepchil-
dren during their minority simply to give them familial stability. See Estate of
Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597 (suggesting that the decedent may have at-
tempted to adopt the foster child to provide financial and emotional support dur-
ing the child's minority). Stepfathers may also have attempted adoption to make
the biological mothers happy.
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III. EVALUATION OF EXISITING REFORM PROPOSALS
Several individuals have recommended proposals to rectify
stepfamily problems. For instance, Thomas Hanson suggests
that the California legislature amend California's intestacy
statute to require "proof of the existence of a legitimate family
relationship" between stepchildren and s.epparents."3  He
suggests that courts use their discretion to evaluate each case's
facts."4 Moreover, Professor Margaret Mahoney recommends
that courts use their discretion when determining
stepchildren's inheritance rights."5 She advocates the use of
the in loco parentis concept, among other criteria, to determine
whether to grant stepchildren inheritance rights."6 Finally,
Maijorie Engel proposes that couples seek premarital counsel-
ing to deal with financial concerns, that attorneys provide a
forum to remarried women to increase their knowledge of legal
issues confronting stepfamily relationships, and that the com-
munity develop strategies to advance stepfamilies' welfare." 7
While all of these proposals promote fairness, this Note will
demonstrate that it is better for the community and the legis-
lature to adopt statutes and policies that not only consider
issues of fairness but also balance fairness with certainty and
judicial efficiency.
A. Thomas Hanson's Proposal
Thomas Hanson suggests that courts evaluate several
factors when determining whether to grant stepchildren inheri-
tance rights. First, a court should determine whether stepchil-
dren have proven that a genuine stepfamily relationship exist-
ed."8 Specifically, Hanson recommends that courts adopt "a
1 Thomas M. Hanson, Note, Intestate Succession For Stepchildren: California
Leads The Way, But Has It Gone Far Enough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 284 (1995).
... See id. at 285.
115 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 938.
116 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 931.
"1 See Engel, supra note 1, at 370-71.
H anson's proposal was suggested prior to the California Supreme Court's
decision in Estate of Joseph. At that time, there was a split among the California
circuit courts regarding whether Section 6454 of the California Probate Code re-
quired one to prove that stepparents would have adopted but for a legal barrier
that existed until the stepparents' deaths, or whether Section 6454 required one to
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strong presumption ... in favor of a legitimate relationship" if
stepchildren show that stepparents "would have adopted
[them] but for a legal barrier.""9 He also indicates that
courts should examine, among other considerations, how step-
children and their deceased stepparents dealt with one anoth-
er. 20 For instance, one should consider whether stepchildren
introduced their stepparents as "Dad" or "Mom" and whether
the deceased stepparents were involved in their stepchildren's
lives by attending the activities in which their stepchildren
participated.121 Finally, in contrast to Professor Mahoney's
proposal discussed below, Hanson's proposal does not require
the stepfamily relationship to form during the stepchildren's
minority.
Although Hanson's genuine stepfamily relationship re-
quirement would promote equity, courts are likely to encounter
difficulty when determining where to draw the line. For in-
stance, it would be difficult for courts to determine whether a
genuine family relationship exists if stepparents are relatively
uninvolved in their stepchildren's extracurricular activities, yet
treat their stepchildren well during the little time they spend
together. What if stepchildren refer to their stepparent as
"Dad" or "Mom" on some occasions and use their stepparent's
first name on other occasions? What if stepparents are never
introduced by their stepchildren as "Dad" or "Mom?" And, what
if stepparents attend the majority of the events in which their
stepchildren participate, but are treated poorly by their step-
children at these events?
To further complicate the issue, many modern biological
parents, as well as stepparents, work in demanding fields that
require long hours, and therefore they have little time to de-
vote to their children's lives. 2 In fact, in 1991, there were
prove that stepparents would have adopted but for a legal barrier that only exist-
ed during the stepchildren's minority. See Hanson, supra note 113, at 279. See
also Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593; Estate of Stevenson, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 252-53.
," Hanson, supra note 113, at 284.
120 See id. at 278-79.
121 See id. at 279.
12 See Urie Bronfenbrenner, Who Cares for America's Children? in THE FUTURE
OF THE FAMILY 139, 141 (Louise Kapp Howe ed., 1972) ("In today's world, parents
find themselves at the mercy of a society which imposes pressures and priorities
that allow neither time nor place for meaningful activities and relations between
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over 11 million children under six years of age with two par-
ents (or their only parent, in the case of single-parent homes)
working."r In such families, parents may disappear for days
due to business travel, and they often return home from work
late at night." As a result, the classic family dinner is al-
most nonexistent in such households. 25  Consequently,
children's nannies, day care workers, and other types of
babysitters may have more contact with parents' children than
do the children's parents.'26 However, those circumstances do
not necessarily indicate that such parents want to deprive
their children of inheritance rights. It can be quite the con-
trary because parents often work long hours to financially
support their children.'27 Therefore, one should not assume
that working parents want their stepchildren and/or biological
children to lack inheritance rights merely because they spend
little time with their children. Rather, one should question how
much weight to accord criteria, such as involvement in
children's extracurricular activities, when determining whether
children and adults, which downgrade the role of parent and the functions of par-
enthood, and which prevent the parent from doing the things he wants to do as a
guide, friend, and companion to his children."). Women have entered the work
force in massive numbers and consequently, working parents raise the majority of
children. It is a luxury to have a mother that stays home. See SELECTED READ-
INGS IN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 127 (Lorene H. Stone ed., Greenhaven Press 1999).
Two income families are not able to traditionally care for their children. Rather,
such families must use alternative child care arrangements such as day care. See
GOODMAN, supra note 60, at 214-15.
12 See Kristin Droege, Day Care Can Benefit Children, in THE FAMILY-OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 124, 129 (Bruno Leone ed., 1998).
12 See Betsy Morris, Is Your Family Wrecking Your Career? in SELECTED READ-
INGS IN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 130, 131 (Lorene H. Stone ed., 1999).
125 See id. at 131.
126 A babysitter often cares for children for more hours than do the children's
parents. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 122, at 142. Child care may include com-
munity and child care centers, au pairs and stay-at-home nannies, workplace facili-
ties, nursery school, and pre-school programs, as well as having children remain
with a babysitter for a regular time during the week. See Droege, supra note 123,
at 125.
1 Since the 1970s, when incomes started to stagnate, it became necessary to
have a second income to maintain a family's standard of living. Income growth
has slowed down and, simultaneously, the cost of a college education, a car, and a
house have dramatically increased. See Morris, supra note 124, at 131, 134. Mone-
tary problems are also more prevalent in stepfamilies since they have lower in-
comes than nuclear families. See GOODMAN, supra note 60, at 295. Thus, it may
be more essential for both parents in stepfamilies to work to maintain their stan-
dard of living as compared with the situation in nuclear families.
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a genuine family relationship exists. Such criteria may not
accurately indicate whether a genuine family relationship
exists in today's society of two-income households, nannies,
and day care."~
One should also probe Hanson's suggestion that enables
stepchildren to obtain inheritance rights when the stepfamily
relationship was formed during the stepchildren's majority.
Rather than reject stepfamily relationships that form after
stepchildren reach majority age, Hanson claims that intestacy
statutes should acknowledge that today's family structure
differs from that of the past.129 Specifically, he advocates a
presumption against the existence of a "legitimate family rela-
tionship" that directly correlates with a stepchild's age during
the stepfamily formation."' In other words, the presumption
is stronger when the stepfamily is formed later in a stepchild's
life, and thus, a court would view stepfamilies that were
formed when stepchildren were toddlers with less "skepticism"
than stepfamilies that were formed when stepchildren were in
their late teens. 3'
Hanson reasons that strong stepfamily relationships can
form during stepchildren's majority, even though such relation-
ships are considerably less likely to develop after
adulthood. 32 Hanson supports his belief by discussing how
adult children frequently confer with their parents to discuss
issues concerning fiscal plans, emotional dilemmas, career
paths, and professional as well as personal relationships.'
Although it is possible for strong bonds to develop between
stepparents and stepchildren when stepfamily relationships
form during stepchildren's majority,' it is simply too big a
128 See Droege, supra note 123, at 125 (discussing how the children of today's
working parents are placed in nontraditional child care programs).
12 See Hanson, supra note 113, at 283-84.
120 Id. at 283-84.
... Id. at 283.
" See id. at 283.
13 See id.
' See Hanson, supra note 113, at 283 (noting the unlikelihood, but not the
impossibility, of family bonds developing between stepchildren and their steppar-
ents when the stepfamily forms during adulthood). See also id. (citing Mahoney,
supra note 7, at 930 ("The likelihood of real family ties between stepparent and
child are remote in cases where the child has reached adulthood at the time of
his or her parent's marriage to the stepparent.")).
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leap to provide inheritance rights to such stepchildren. Indeed,
most state legislatures do not even provide inheritance rights
to stepchildren who were minors when the stepfamily was
formed.'35 Perhaps, if state legislatures extend inheritance
rights to stepchildren who were minors during the stepfamily
formation, the next appropriate step will be for state legisla-
tures to consider stepfamily relationships that were formed
during the stepchildren's majority.
Finally, although Hanson's proposal may promote more
justice than does Section 6454 of the California Probate Code,
his proposal does not comply with an intestacy statute's goals.
An intestacy statute is not meant to reflect what a particular
testator had in mind. Rather, an intestacy statute is a default
position that is meant to reflect what the majority of people in
the decedent's position would want to happen in the event of
death."6 In other words, "Intestacy laws are designed to ef-
fectuate testamentary intent in the large majority of cases for
property owners who die without a valid will."' That default
position is meant to provide certainty and avoid unnecessary
court proceedings upon death.'
Since it is likely that there will be more stepfamilies than
nuclear families in the future, Hanson's proposal is likely to
congest the courts with thousands of stepchildren trying to
prove that they had genuine family relationships with their
stepparents. Courts will be overwhelmed with the task of de-
termining a particular testator's intent on a case-by-case basis.
Consequently, it may be difficult for stepchildren to anticipate
whether they have inheritance rights when each case will
depend on its particular set of facts. Such a result is inconsis-
tent with the goals of intestacy statutes.
135 But see CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 1999) (providing inheritance
rights to stepchildren when the stepfamily relationship began during the child's
minority, continued during the child's and parent's life together, and clear and
convincing evidence establishes that a legal barrier prevented the child's adoption).
135 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 74.
"s Mahoney, supra note 7, at 928.
138 See Hanson, supra note 113, at 278 (indicating that the Cleveland decision
may better satisfy intestacy statutes' traditional aim of certainty). See also
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 931 (noting that certainty is one goal towards which
intestacy statutes aim).
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B. Professor Margaret Mahoney's Proposal
Like Thomas Hanson's suggestion, Professor Mahoney's
proposal may also promote more justice than the existing state
intestacy laws, including California's intestacy statute.
Mahoney rejects the theory of equitable adoption and proposes
that courts grant stepchildren inheritance rights if the follow-
ing three requirements are met. First, the stepfamily relation-
ship must form during the stepchildren's minority.13 9 Second,
the relationship must continue during the lives of the steppar-
ents and their stepchildren. 4 ° Third, "an in loco parentis re-
lationship [must exist] during the [step] child [ren]'s minori-
ty.21141
Sound reasoning underlies Mahoney's rejection of the
equitable adoption doctrine.14 Equitable adoption allows an
individual to inherit from an intestate decedent's estate by pro:
viding him or her with an adopted child's status' when
there is a "clear and complete agreement to adopt."'" Hence,
the doctrine fails to safeguard stepfamilies' interests"45 be-
cause it is rare for courts to provide stepchildren with the
status of "equitably adopted children."46
Logic also underlies Mahoney's suggestion that courts
should not grant stepchildren inheritance rights when the
family relationship formed during the stepchildren's majori-
ty.17 Although it is still possible for strong steprelationships
to develop in the aforementioned situation, it is not likely that
strong family bonds will form under those circumstances.'
While Mahoney agrees with California's requirement that
stepchildren must be minors when the stepfamily was
... See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 930. The California Supreme Court has also
interpreted Section 6454 of the California Probate Code to require that the family
relationship was formed during the children's minority. See Estate of Joseph, 949
P.2d at 477.
1 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 932.
.41 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 936.
2 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 936.
1 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 925.
'" Mahoney, supra note 7, at 927.
14 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 928.
4 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 926, 950 n.42.
147 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 930.
14, See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 930.
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formed,149 she believes that the California intestacy statute is
under-inclusive in ascertaining situations where close-knit
stepfamily relationships exist. 5 ° For instance, the California
statute, which grants inheritance rights to stepchildren when
they prove, inter alia, that stepparents "would have adopted
but for a legal barrier," does not necessarily indicate whether
stepparents wish to give inheritance rights to their stepchil-
dren.' Consequently, Mahoney suggests that it is more equi-
table for courts to use the common law in loco parentis"' doc-
trine to decide whether a de facto relationship existed between
stepparents and stepchildren.' When making such determi-
nations, courts may assess evidence, including the stepparent's
performance of domestic tasks for stepchildren, the
stepparent's performance of parental counseling, and the
stepparent's monetary support. 154
It is quite convincing for Mahoney to suggest that state
legislatures adopt the in loco parentis test. That test is broader
than the California Probate Code, which requires stepparents
to attempt adoption. 55 Mahoney reasons that stepparents
may not legally formalize relationships with their stepchildren
even though stepparents may love their stepchildren and no
legal impediment to adoption exists.5 More specifically, as
Part II.C of this Note demonstrates, stepparents who want
their stepchildren to have inheritance rights may avoid adop-
tion to prevent their stepchildren from confronting emotional
issues that may arise in the context of adoption.157
However, although Mahoney's proposal would be ideal in
that it "[rielates [inheritance] to the quality of the
14 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 930, 932 (referring to the California Probate
Code's requirement that a stepfamily be formed during the stepchildren's minority
and the requirement that the relationship endure during the stepparent's and
stepchildren's lives).
... See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 931.
151 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 931.
112 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990) (defining in loco parentis as
'[i]n the place of a parent; instead of a parent, charged, factitiously, with a
parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities").
" See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 931-32.
... See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 931.
... See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 930-31.
"' See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 931.
15' See infra Part II.C.
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steprelationship during the child's minority,""'8 one must
realize that intestacy laws governing the disposition of proper-
ty among members of traditional families do not always corre-
spond to the quality of every traditional family relationship.
No such qualitative analysis is necessary to determine inheri-
tance rights among traditional families because courts assume
that most traditional family members wish to pasg their es-
tates to blood relatives.'59 Similarly, one should not expect
intestacy laws governing the disposition of property among
stepfamilies to correspond to the quality of every stepfamily
relationship.
The costs of implementing the in loco parentis test may
also far outweigh the test's benefits, considering the case-based
nature of Mahoney's proposal and the continuing increase in
the number of stepfamilies. 60 Hence, such a case-based de-
termination would not only congest the courts as the number
of stepfamilies increased, but would also create uncertainty
about the outcome of each particular case. 6' Even though
Mahoney argues that "[tihe Pennsylvania Legislature has...
authorized a case-by-case determination when the adopted
child seeks to inherit from natural relatives" and equitable
results have followed, one state's authorization should not be
viewed as a green light indication that such a plan is wise.'62
Finally, Mahoney's in loco parentis test may also have the
unfortunate effect of causing stepparents to intentionally sepa-
rate themselves from their stepchildren to prevent such chil-
dren from obtaining inheritance rights.6 '
If judges are allowed to make case-by-case determinations,
then other individuals might attempt to extend the case-by-
.5 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 932.
'5, See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 918.
° See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 936-37; Norton & Miller, supra note 42, at 1.
... See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 936-37 (indicating that the proposal evokes
concerns about certainty).
W2 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 937.
See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Fami-
ly, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 123-24 (1996) (fearing that stepfathers will distance
themselves from stepchildren to avoid parental responsibility following divorce). See
also id. (citing K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 572 (D.C. 1994)). See also Engel,
supra note 1, at 329 (citing David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning From Social
Sciences: A Model For Reformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamililes, 97 DICK. L.
REv. 49, 52 & n.17 (1992) (discussing In re Marriage of Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d 76
(Iowa Ct. App. 1991))).
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case analysis from the more defined stepfamily context to a
setting without any boundaries. For example, just as stepchil-
dren might try to convince judges to grant them inheritance
rights if the stepchildren had close relationships with their
stepparents, a decedent's close friends might also try to con-
vince judges to grant them inheritance rights if the friends had
close relationships with the decedent. To further complicate
matters, some of a decedent's blood relatives might try to per-
suade judges to withhold inheritance rights from other blood
relatives who were not closely tied to the decedent. Contrary to
the goals of intestacy laws, such actions would prolong estate
settlement and produce uncertainty.
Furthermore, even though Mahoney claims that fairly
solid standards will bind judges who apply the in loco parentis
test and that the test's components are objective enough to
enable individuals to determine their inheritance rights in
most situations," it may not be as easy for a judge or a fam-
ily member to identify strong stepfamily relationships as
Mahoney supposes. Objective standards may not really exist
because Mahoney's in loco parentis test grants judges broad
discretion in determining stepchildren's inheritance rights.
Notwithstanding Mahoney's aim of "individualized justice,"
the result is often "an illusion, while the social cost of trying to
achieve it... is high."65 Broad discretion in estate distribu-
tion could result in advertisements such as the following:
Disappointed in your parent's will? Not invited to your ex-husband's
funeral? Feel left out in the cold when your best friend died without
a will? You may have valuable legal rights in the estate of a de-
ceased parent, patron, ex-spouse or pal. Call Smooch, Smathers and
Smunch for a free consultation. 166
If a discretionary intestacy statute granted inheritance rights
to stepchildren, it is likely that the above advertisement would
read, "Feel left out in the cold when your [stepparent] died
without a will?"'67 Such advertisements are likely to result in
See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 938.
" Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law
and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1986) (citing Richard Epstein,
Settlement and Litigation: Of Vices Individual and Institutional, 30 U. Cml. L.
SCH. REc. 2 (1984)).
"' Id. at 1189.
i See id.
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a flooding of the courts. Thus, rather than allow judges to have
broad discretion in such legal areas, state legislatures should
adopt a statute that eliminates the need to consult judges
when an intestate stepparent dies. Such a statute should bal-
ance fairness, predictability, and cost.
C. Marjorie Engel's Proposal
Maijorie Engel's article focuses on the financial conse-
quences of existing policies and laws concerning stepfamily
inheritance and the financial obligations of stepparents."s
Many suggestions contained in her "five-point strategy" to
improve the value of stepfamily relationships are applicable to
rectifying the problems associated with stepchildren's inheri-
tance rights.'69 For instance, Engel recommends that couples
seek "pre-remarriage counseling" to help them confront finan-
cial concerns related to the stepfamily unit.170 Couples should
talk about managing their money and such conversations
should address inheritance issues.' Engel also proposes that
women learn about the laws that impact their lives,' and
she recommends that policies be advanced to foster
stepfamilies' welfare.'73
Although it is laudable for Engel to suggest that couples
seek premarital counseling,7 4 stepfamilies may not receive
that recommendation with open arms. Stepparents may not be
inclined to discuss financial and inheritance issues at the be-
ginning of their remarriages.'75 In addition, just as steppar-
ents may avoid writing wills due to a belief that it is an expen-
sive and lengthy process,7 6 stepparents may also avoid finan-
"' See Engel, supra note 1, at 310-11.
... Engel, supra note 1, at 370.
170 Engel, supra note 1, at 370.
171 See Engel, supra note 1, at 371 (citing MARGORIE ENGEL, WEDDINGS A FAMI-
LY AFFAIR: THE NEW ETIQUETTE FOR SECOND MARRIAGES AND COUPLES WITH DI-
VORCED PARENTS 149 (1998)).
172 See Engel, supra note 1, at 371.
,72 See Engel, supra note 1, at 370.
174 See Engel, supra note 1, at 370.
17. See Susan Littwin, Combining Grown Families, in SELECTED READINGS IN
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, supra note 124, 235-36 (discussing how money is the cause
of many stepfamily problems).
176 See DUKEM1NIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 71 (discussing how some
individuals do not execute wills because of the cost and the belief that it is a "big
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cial counseling because of its cost, time, and the friction that
may result from a discussion of financial issues.
Furthermore, Engel's suggestion that the legal and finan-
cial community increase awareness among women by present-
ing them with forums about marital issues is also notewor-
thy.'77 However, that suggestion will probably be costly.
Hence, such informational programs will most likely be inac-
cessible to many stepfamilies, who will not have the opportuni-
ty to learn about legal issues that are unique to the stepfamily
unit. Consequently, most stepparents will not realize that they
need to write a will to provide their stepchildren with inheri-
tance rights, and stepchildren will not inherit anything from
such intestate stepparents.
In addition, Engel also proposes that women learn about
the laws that impact their lives.'78 That suggestion has mer-
it, and, if followed not only by women but also by men, could
help stepparents avoid the intestacy problems that modern
stepfamilies encounter. Perhaps stepparents would execute
wills specifically stating whether they wanted their stepchil-
dren to have inheritance rights if they learned about the lack
of stepchildren's inheritance rights under intestacy statutes.
However, one must realize that intestacy statutes are written
to protect people who do not seek an attorney's advice concern-
ing estate distribution and, consequently, do not write a will.
Thus, one must determine how to protect individuals who are
unfamiliar with such laws that will, nevertheless, have an
impact on their lives.
Conceivably, one could restore dignity to remarriage by
implementing Engel's recommendation that society establish
"[t]he Permanent Commission on the Status of the Fami-
ly.""'9 Such a commission could present new proposals to the
legal world and could discern how to make remarriage less
damaging to children and women living in stepfamilies."8 It
might also be able to help resolve stepfamily concerns and
advocate laws that would protect stepfamilies' interests."
deal" to meet with a lawyer).
" See Engel, supra note 1, at 373.
..8 See Engel, supra note 1, at 371.
17' Engel, supra note 1, at 379-80.
"sa See Engel, supra note 1, at 379-80.
.8 See Engel, supra note 1, at 379-80.
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Engel is also correct to stress the unfortunate consequenc-
es related to the reduction of "reliable data" concerning remar-
riage and stepfamily units.182 Such information, which re-
flects the changing composition of American families, is not
only essential for designing financial plans for stepfamilies, but
is also important for developing new intestacy schemes that
accurately reflect the intent of stepparents." Thus, Engel's
suggestion that research groups examine stepfamily relation-
ships is wise, especially considering the reduction of govern-
ment involvement in that arena."8
Finally, Engel cleverly proposes a new type of adoption
that could automatically occur when one marries a stepchild's
"biological parent but would not" affect the obligations or "in-
heritance eligibility" of both biological parents.'85 Engel
states, "It would legitimize the stepparent/stepchild relation-
ship, recognize that biology is not the sole determining factor
of whether someone is a parent, and publicly acknowledge an
important source of care-taking and support for the child." 86
This type of adoption may alleviate many of the problems con-
cerning stepchildren's inheritance rights. However, it may
simultaneously create many problems for stepparents who
prefer to pass more of their estate to their biological children
and other blood relatives rather than to their stepchildren.
IV. PROPOSED INTESTACY STATUTE
It is challenging to formulate a proposal regarding
stepchildren's inheritance rights, considering that the federal
government no longer collects detailed information on divorces
and marriages from the states.87 In fact, the termination of
such programs "will result in a loss of data to researchers who
currently rely on this data source for information on annual
changes in the collective marriage and divorce behavior of the
1'2 Engel, supra note 1, at 374. See also Change in Marriage and Divorce Data
Available From the National Center for Health Statistics, 60 FED. REG. 64437
(1995).
,,' See Engel, supra note 1, at 374.
,,' See Engel, supra note 1, at 374-75.
... Engel, supra note 1, at 377-78.
16" Engel, supra note 1, at 378.
11 See 60 FED. REG. at 64438.
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population, including trends and differentials in the propensity
to marry, to divorce, and to remarry after divorce or widow-
hood."' However, researchers may still extract information
from various sources, such as population reports, birth regis-
tration records, statistical surveys, and sociological literature
examining stepfamily relationships.'89 Such sociological data
offers judges and legislators a way to evaluate stepfamily rela-
tionships. 1"° And, "to cast off the use of social science re-
search in law would be to ignore a wealth of information, albe-
it not applicable to every individual case, but nonetheless con-
siderably better than the conjectures of judges and legisla-
tors."19' Such data indicates that "intestacy statutes ignore
the reality of modern family life" by using biological status to
determine children's inheritance rights.'92 Thus, legislators
must examine sociological findings when drafting intestacy
statutes to more accurately reflect the changing composition of
the American family.'93
Specifically, sociological findings indicate that the number
of stepfamilies is increasing and that the stepfamily structure
appears to be replacing or at least co-existing with the tradi-
tional family.'94 In fact, "[it is clear that children today are
living in a much wider variety of living arrangements than
188 Id.
189 See id. at 64437-38.
" See David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning From Social Sciences: A Model
For Reformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 DICK. L. REV. 49, 50
(1992).
191 Id.
1 Engel, supra note 1, at 363-64.
188 See Fine & Fine, supra note 190, at 67-68.
194 See Stepfamily Foundation, supra note 38 ("By the year 2000, according to
the Census Bureau, more Americans will be living in stepfamilies than in nuclear
families."). However, despite the predicted increase in the number of stepfamilies,
the divorce rate has not increased in the last ten years. See Norton & Miller,
supra note 42, at 1.
Between the late 1960s and 1980, the divorce rate doubled, reaching a level
where at least one out of two marriages was expected to end in divorce. The di-
vorce rate remained relatively unchanged during the 1980s, exhibiting a small
drop toward the end of the decade. The first marriage and remarriage rates de-
clined rather constantly throughout both the 1970s and 1980s. The divorce trend
reflected in these rates implies a continued high proportion of marriages ending in
divorce, even though there has been no increase in the last decade. See Norton &
Miller, supra note 42, at 1.
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they were 20 years ago.""'5 Whereas, in 1980, 3.9 million
married parents had one or more stepchildren under 18, in
1990, 5.3 million of such families existed.'96 Experts even
predicted that stepfamilies would outnumber traditional fami-
lies in the United States by the twenty-first century.9 7
Hence, the existing intestacy laws, which almost entirely disre-
gard the stepfamily relationship, will frequently affect
stepfamilies in a harsh manner.
In addition, stepfamilies are not necessarily less close-knit
than traditional families because all types of twenty-first cen-
tury families encounter their own share of problems, some
families dealing with difficulty better than other families.
Thus, all stepchildren should not lack inheritance rights when
courts award such rights to biological children.
However, several reasons indicate why one should not take
a grand leap and allow unadopted stepchildren to obtain a
share of inheritance rights equal to the share belonging to
biological and adopted children. First, stepparents have the
option to write wills, which specify their intent to provide for
stepchildren."' Second, stepparents may attempt to adopt
stepchildren so that stepchildren are considered blood relatives
in the law's eyes. In fact, "[sltepparents are among this
country's largest group of adopters."'99 Third, a strong soci-
etal notion about the importance of blood relations still exists,
and consequently, society views the stepfamily relationship in
an unfavorable light, although much less negatively than in
the past.
Hence, one must examine several factors to determine
whether inheritance rights should be awarded to stepchildren
and the amount that should be awarded to them. Similar to
California's intestacy statute and Mahoney's proposal, the first
essential criterion should require that stepfamily relationships
be formed during a stepchild's minority."' Common sense in-
199 Norton & Miller, supra note 42, at 9.
196 See Norton & Miller, supra note 42, at 9.
' Wicked Stepmothers, Fact or Fiction? (visited Jan. 14, 2000)
<httpJ/www.secondwivesclub.com/fairytalesl.htm>.
19 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 159 (explaining that indi-
viduals who execute wills must be at least eighteen years old and also must "be
of sound mind").
19' Stepparent Adoptions, supra note 37.
21 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454(a) (West Supp. 2000); Mahoney, supra note 7,
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dicates that it is more likely for minor children, rather than for
adult children, to develop close relationships with their step-
parents."' A requirement that the stepfamily relationship be
formed during stepchildren's minority is also likely to have the
desired effect of impacting many stepchildren because one-
third of today's living children are expected to enter into
stepfamily relationships before they reach majority age. 2
Because stepfamily relationships will develop into stronger
units as time passes, a second important requirement is the
number of years that the stepfamily relationship lasted.0 3 In
fact, a stepfather's or stepmother's commitment is positively
related to the length of time that a particular stepfamily has
existed. 4 Thus, it is reasonable to believe that a stepparent
would want his or her stepchildren to have inheritance rights
if the stepfamily relationship endured.
The legislature should use the number of years that a
stepfamily relationship endured to derive the percentage of the
stepparent's estate that intestacy statutes should award to
stepchildren. For example, a stepfamily relationship that last-
ed for ten years should enable stepchildren to obtain a larger
share than the share received by stepchildren who were in-
volved in stepfamily relationships that lasted for fewer years.
Furthermore, stepchildren should not receive large intes-
tate shares if their deceased stepparents were married to their
biological parents for a short period because "redivorce is most
likely to occur in the early ... years of a remarriage" and
stepchildren receive no inheritance rights after divorce. 5 It
would not be wise to give large intestate shares to such step-
at 930.
201 See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 930.
2 See Arnold, supra note 46.
20 "Caring relationships take time to evolve. The expectation of 'instant love'
between stepparents and stepchildren can lead to many disappointments and diffi-
culties. If the stepfamily relationships are allowed to develop as seems comfortable
to the individuals involved, then caring between step-relatives has the opportunity
to develop." VISHER & VISHER, supra note 52, at 80.
214 See VISHER & VISHER, supra note 52, at 80.
2' Engel, supra note 1, at 368 (citing Norton & Miller, supra, note 42, at 6).
See Norton & Miller, supra note 42 (citing Teresa Castro Martin & Larry L.
Bumpass, Recent Trends and Differentials in Marital Disruption, DEMOGRAPHY, Vol.
26, No. 1. pp. 37-51, 1989). See also Norton & Miller, supra note 42, at 8 (indicat-
ing that 6.3 years is the average duration of first marriages for women between
the ages of 20 and 54).
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children because it is likely that many of their parents' remar-
riages would have ended in divorce had the deceased parent
lived a short while longerY In that situation, stepchildren
would have no right to inherit from the divorced parent's es-
tate. Hence, the legislature should not award a large inheri-
tance right to such stepchildren because they would have had
no inheritance right if their stepparent terminated the short
marriage before death.
Sociological data is also likely to lead one to believe that
stepchildren should not be given inheritance rights equal to
those awarded to biological or adopted children. Rather, step-
children should receive a percentage of their stepparent's es-
tate based on a sliding scale similar to the sliding scale per-
centage to which a spouse is entitled to an elective share under
Section 2-202 of the UPC."7 Hence, the following proposal
incorporates such a sliding scale percentage."'
" See Norton & Miller, supra note 42, at 8.
207 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLs, TRUSTS, AND Es-
TATES 486 (5th ed. 1995) (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 102
(1998)).
(a) [Elective-Share Amount]. The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies
domiciled in this State has a right of election, under the limitations and
conditions stated in this Part, to take an elective-share amount equal to
the value of the elective-share percentage of the augmented estate, deter-
mined by the length of time the spouse and the decedent were married
to each other, in accordance with the following schedule.
If the decedent and the spouse The elective-share percentage is:
were married to each other:
Less than 1 year Supplemental Amount Only
1 year but less than 2 years 3% of the augmented estate
2 years but less than 3 years 6% of the augmented estate
3 years but less than 4 years 9% of the augmented estate
4 years but less than 5 years 12% of the augmented estate
5 years but less than 6 years 15% of the augmented estate
6 years but less than 7 years 18% of the augmented estate
7 years but less than 8 years 21% of the augmented estate
8 years but less than 9 years 24% of the augmented estate
9 years but less than 10 years 27% of the augmented estate
10 years but less than 11 years 30% of the augmented estate
11 years but less than 12 years 34% of the augmented estate
12 years but less than 13 years 38% of the augmented estate
13 years but less than 14 years 42% of the augmented estate
14 years but less than 15 years 46% of the augmented estate
15 years or more 50% of the augmented estate
Id. (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 102 (1998)).
2" See id.
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If the decedent Percentage of Acceleration
& the spouse estate to which rate:
were married to stepchildren
each other: are entitled:
Less than I year 0.0
> 0.5
1 year but less than 2 years 0.5
> 1.0
2 years but less than 3 years 1.5
> 1.5
3 years but less than 4 years 3.0
> 2.0
4 years but less than 5 years 5.0
> 2.5
5 years but less than 6 years 7.5
> 3.0
6 years but less than 7 years 10.5
> 3.5
7 years but less than 8 years 14.0
> 4.0
8 years but less than 9 years 18.0
> 4.5
9 years but less than 10 years 22.5
> 5.0
10 years but less than 11 years 27.5
> 5.5
11 years but less than 12 years 33.0
> 6.0
12 years but less than 13 years 39.0
> 6.5
13 years but less than 14 years 45.5
> 7.0
14 years but less than 15 years 52.5
> 7.5
15 years or more 60.0
This proposed intestacy statute gives stepchildren minimal
inheritance rights when their stepparent was married to their
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biological parent for a short period of time. For instance, a
stepchild whose stepparent remained married to the child's
biological parent for at least two years, but less than three
years, will only receive 1.5% of that stepparent's estate. By
comparison, the proposed statute rewards a stepchild, whose
stepparent remained married to the child's biological parent for
a longer time, by not only increasing the child's overall share
of their stepparent's estate for each year that the marriage
endured but also by accounting for an acceleration factor. The
acceleration factor increases the inheritance award even more
for every additional year that the marriage lasts. Furthermore,
this proposed statute recognizes that stepchildren are signifi-
cant family members, by ultimately allowing stepchildren to
obtain 60% of the estate to which the biological children would
be entitled.
However, it is important to realize that stepchildren will
not necessarily receive a percentage of the intestate
stepparent's entire estate under this proposed statute. In other
words, stepchildren whose parents were married for 15 years
will not necessarily receive 60% of the stepparent's entire es-
tate. Rather, stepchildren may only receive a percentage of a
portion of the intestate stepparent's estate. In other words,
stepchildren may only receive 60% of a portion of the
stepparent's estate when the remarriage lasted for 15 or more
years.
To determine the portion of an intestate parent's estate to
which biological children are entitled, one must first refer to
the intestacy statute of the state in which the decedent died.
Under the above proposed statute, the portion of an intestate
parent's estate to which biological children are entitled will be
the same portion to which stepchildren are entitled."9 For
instance, Section 4-1.1 of the New York Estate Powers and
Trusts Law awards "fifty thousand dollars and one-half of the
residue" to a decedent's living spouse when the decedent is
'" This assumes that the stepparent is either only survived by stepchildren and
no biological children or that the stepparent is survived by equal numbers of step-
children and biological children. However, if either the surviving stepchildren out-
number the surviving biological children or the surviving biological children out-
number the surviving stepchildren, then the portion to which one applies the per-
centage that stepchildren receive will not necessarily be the same portion that
biological children receive. See supra Part IV.
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survived by issue21 and a spouse.211 The other one-half bal-
ance passes to the issue.212 Thus, according to the above re-
form proposal, in New York, stepchildren, like biological chil-
dren, should have a claim to the remaining one-half balance if
the decedent is also survived by a spouse.
For example, suppose a New York intestate decedent had
an estate worth $1.05 million and was survived by one step-
child and a spouse, to whom the decedent was married for 15
years. In that scenario, the surviving spouse would receive
$50,000 plus one-half of the residue, which is $500,000. Thus,
the surviving spouse would receive a total of $550,000. The
other one-half of the residue, or $500,000, is the portion that
biological children are entitled to receive. Hence, under the
proposed statute, stepchildren would receive a percentage of
that one-half portion ($500,000) because stepchildren are enti-
tled to a percentage of the same portion to which biological
children are entitled.
After one determines the portion of which stepchildren are
entitled to take a percentage, one must determine the percent-
age of the portion that stepchildren are entitled to take. The
proposed intestacy statute specifies that stepchildren are enti-
tled to 60% of their stepparent's estate if the decedent and
spouse were married for 15 years or more. Hence, according to
the above hypothetical, the stepchild would receive 60% of one-
half of the residue ($500,000), or $300,000.213
210 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (defining issue as individuals who "de-
scended from a common ancestor" and noting that adopted children are considered
the "issue" of their adoptive parents in many states). Hence, biological children
and most adopted children are considered issue. See id.
211 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(a)(1) (McKinney 1999). Intestacy
statutes vary in the amount to which they award the surviving spouse. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.102 (West 1999) (awarding a surviving spouse $20,000 plus
one-half of the estate when the decedent is survived by lineal descendants); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.105 (West 1999) (awarding a surviving spouse $60,000
plus one-half of the estate when the decedent is survived by issue); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 31-2-104 (1999) (awarding a surviving spouse "either one-third (1/3) or a
child's share of the entire intestate estate, whichever is" larger, when the decedent
is survived by issue).
212 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(a)(1).
21' However, in New York, as in many other states, biological issue receive a
share of the entire estate, rather than one-half of the residue, if a spouse pre-
deceases the intestate decedent. In that situation, stepchildren should also be able
to claim a percentage of the whole estate. Thus, according to the facts in the
hypothetical, stepchildren would receive 60% of $1.5 million (entire estate), or
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The above hypothetical situation assumes that a decedent
is survived by stepchildren and no biological children. Howev-
er, if stepchildren and biological children survive the decedent,
then a stepchild should not receive 60% of the one-half residue
($500,000) because it is not reasonable to award a stepchild
60% of the estate, or $300,000, and to award biological children
only 40% of the estate, or $200,000. Hence, when a decedent is
survived by both stepchildren and biological children, one
needs to first divide the residue by the total number of step-
children and biological children.
For example, if the decedent is survived by one stepchild
and one biological child, then one should divide the residue
($500,000) by two since there are two children. That division
yields $250,000. The stepchild would take 60% of $250,000 (the
residue divided by two), which is $150,000. The biological child
will receive the difference between the one-half residue
($500,000) and the amount that the stepchild would receive
($150,000), which is $350,000. Hence, according to this hypo-
thetical situation, the stepchild would receive $150,000 and the
biological child would receive $350,000.
The equation will differ slightly if a decedent is not sur-
vived by equal numbers of stepchildren and biological children.
For instance, if a decedent is survived by one stepchild and
five biological children, then one should divide the residue
($500,000) by six since there are six children. That division
yields $83,333. The one stepchild should receive 60% of
$83,333, which is $49,999.80. The five biological children
should receive the difference between the residue ($500,000)
and the amount that the stepchild receives ($49,999.80). Thus,
the total amount that the five biological children would receive
is $450,000.20, and each biological child would receive
$90,000.04.
Similarly, if a decedent is survived by five stepchildren
and one biological child, then one should divide the residue
($500,000) by six since there are six children. Again, that divi-
sion yields $83,333. However, that figure ($83,333) should be
multiplied by five since there are five stepchildren. That multi-
plication yields $416,665. The five children should receive 60%
$630,000, if their stepparent was not survived by a spouse or any biological chil-
dren.
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of $416,665, which is a total of $249,999. Hence, each stepchild
would receive $49,999.80. The one biological child would re-
ceive the difference between the residue ($500,000) and the
amount that the stepchildren receive ($249,999). Thus, the
biological child would receive $250,001. Most importantly, in
all of the above examples, each biological child would receive
more money than each stepchild, while stepchildren are none-
theless awarded significant inheritance rights.
One may argue that this proposed statute is flawed in the
same ways in which the spousal elective share concept is defi-
cient. Specifically, the elective share concept may not protect a
spouse because the portion of the decedent's estate against
which the surviving spouse may elect 2 14 may be drastically
reduced if the decedent spouse conveyed assets through inter
vivos transfers, joint tenancies, and other will substitutes.21
Similarly, one may argue that the decedent stepparent may
also reduce the portion of his or her estate of which the step-
children receive a percentage by conveying property through
inter vivos transfers and various will substitutes to individuals
other than stepchildren.
However, one may counter that argument by explaining
how some states, such as New York, have rectified flaws asso-
ciated with spousal elective share statutes. For instance, New
York now requires the estate against which a spouse elects to
include certain will substitutes, such as property owned in the
form of joint tenancy.216 The UPC also attempted to correct
such concerns by requiring the estate against which the spouse
elects to include certain will substitutes.217 Thus, even if the
decedent spouse used will substitutes to gift assets to other
individuals, those assets will be brought back into the estate to
determine the share that the surviving spouse receives." 8
214 "Under typical American elective-share law, including the elective share pro-
vided by the pre-1990 Uniform Probate Code, a surviving spouse may claim a one-
third share of the decedent's estate .... " DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note
1, at 482.
211 See Glendon, supra note 165, at 1190.
211 See generally N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney 1999).
217 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 207, at 513-16 (citing UNIF. PRO-
BATE CODE §§ 2-203 to 2-208 (West 1999)).
218 See id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-203 to 2-208 (West 1999)).
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Stepchildren may be in a situation similar to that of sur-
viving spouses if decedents intentionally transferred assets out
of their estates to deprive stepchildren from receiving a per-
centage of the estate. Decedents may have transferred assets
to financially provide for biological children at the expense of
stepchildren. Thus, a court should also consider bringing some
transferred assets back into the decedents' estates.219
Furthermore, although one may argue against this pro-
posed statute by claiming that allowing such inheritance rights
would enable stepchildren to obtain a double inheritance, such
an argument is not particularly convincing. In actuality, it is
not likely that stepchildren will inherit from their stepparents
and again from their non-custodial biological parents because
"noncustodial parents appear particularly likely to disinherit
their minor children."22' Thus, it is necessary to permit step-
children to inherit from both stepparents and biological par-
ents to preserve some type of inheritance right for stepchil-
dren. Otherwise, stepchildren may not inherit from either their
stepparents or their non-custodial biological parents because
most intestacy statutes do not award inheritance rights to
stepchildren and because non-custodial biological parents are
inclined to disinherit their children. 2
It is even more alarming to learn that stepchildren may
not only be prevented from receiving a portion of their
stepparents' and non-custodial parents' estates, but that they
may also be prevented from inheriting assets belonging to their
custodial biological parent. For instance, a wife may will her
entire estate to her second husband, rather than to her biologi-
cal child from her first marriage, under the impression that
the child will inherit from her second husband. However, the
second husband, who is the child's stepparent, receives com-
plete control over the wife's estate after she wills it to him.
219 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(b)(1) (McKinney 1999) (treat-
ing certain inter vivos transfers as will substitutes and bringing the value of those
assets back into the estate against which the surviving spouse may elect).
220 Engel, supra note 1, at 360 (quoting Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child
from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REv. 2, 9 (1996)).
221 See Engel, supra note 1, at 360 (citing Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the
Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 2, 9
(1996)); DUKEMINIR & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 536 (stating that parents can
disinherit their children in every state except one).
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Hence, if the second husband dies intestate, then the wife's
assets over which her second husband had control do not nec-
essarily pass to the husband's stepchild (the wife's child from
her first marriage). Under most existing intestacy statutes, the
husband's other blood relatives would inherit his wife's assets,
and unfortunately, the second husband's stepchild would not
inherit anything that belonged to his or her biological mother.
CONCLUSION
The rise in the number of stepfamilies indicates that the
structure of the twenty-first century family is changing.222 In
fact, the stepfamily seems to be supplanting the traditional
family unit.2 23 Yet, intestacy statutes do not reflect this
change. Hence, stepchildren, who have close relationships with
their stepparents, may be harshly affected by their lack of
inheritance rights under most intestacy statutes. Even
California's intestacy statute does not provide the majority of
stepchildren with inheritance rights.2" This situation ap-
pears to be even more serious because the majority of people
die intestate.2
The intestacy statute proposed in this Note is an attempt
to rectify the aforementioned problems by recognizing
stepfamilies' existence and providing stepchildren with inheri-
tance rights that satisfy the intent of the majority of twenty-
first century stepparents. The proposal distributes property as
do other intestacy statutes, which distribute a decedent's es-
tate based on "legal status relationships."2 6 The proposed
statute accords stepchildren with a type of legal status and
provides them with an entitlement based on the length of the
remarriage rather than distributing a decedent's estate to
stepchildren based on the particular facts of each case.
The stepfamily is a current day phenomenon that society
must accept. Although thoughts of awarding inheritance rights
to stepchildren may have appeared radical to people living a
century ago, stepfamilies are the norm in the twenty-first cen-
See Norton & Miller, supra note 42, at 1.
22 See id. See also Stepfamily Foundation, supra note 38.
224 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2000).
"2 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 71.
226 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 928.
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tury, and therefore state legislatures should amend intestacy
statutes to account for and to keep pace with the changing
family structure. Social scientists need to continue researching
in this field to provide legislators with the necessary data to
formulate intestacy statutes that satisfy the intent of the ma-
jority of intestate stepparents.
Kim A. Feigenbaum

